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Abstract—A private information retrieval (PIR) scheme on
coded storage systems with colluding, byzantine, and non-
responsive servers is presented. Furthermore, the scheme can
also be used for symmetric PIR in the same setting.
An explicit scheme using an [n, k] generalized Reed-Solomon
storage code is designed, protecting against t-collusion and
handling up to b byzantine and r non-responsive servers, when
n ≥ n′ = (ν +1)k+ t+2b+ r− 1, for some integer ν ≥ 1. This
scheme achieves a PIR rate of 1− k+2b+t+r−1
n′
. In the case where
the capacity is known, namely when k = 1, it is asymptotically
capacity achieving as the number of files grows.
I. INTRODUCTION
Private information retrieval (PIR) is concerned with design-
ing schemes for a user to retrieve a certain file from a storage
system without revealing the identity of the file to the servers.
This problem was introduced by Chor, Goldreich, Kushilevitz
and Sudan in [1], where the database was viewed as an m-bit
binary string x = [x1 · · ·xm] ∈ {0, 1}m from which the user
wants to retrieve one bit xi while keeping the index i hidden
from the server. In this work, we consider files x = [x1 · · ·xm]
encoded and stored on n servers, and assume that the user
wants to retrieve a file xi from the storage system.
One way to achieve privacy is for the user to download
all the files from the system. Of course, this scheme has a
very high communication cost, or equivalently a very low PIR
rate. The rate of a PIR scheme in this model is measured as
the ratio of the amount of the gained information over the
amount of the total downloaded data, while upload costs of
the requests are usually ignored. In case of a single server
storing the database, the trivial solution is the only way to
guarantee information-theoretic privacy [1].
Related work: Initially, PIR constructions served to reduce the
total download cost from a storage system with data replicated
on multiple servers [2]–[7].
More recently, PIR schemes were constructed on coded
data. The authors in [8] show that downloading one extra
bit is enough to achieve privacy, if the number of servers is
exponential in the number of files. In [9], the authors derive
bounds on the tradeoff between storage cost and download cost
for linearly coded data. The optimal upper bounds on PIR rate
were derived in [10]. For maximum distance separable (MDS)
coded data, PIR schemes were presented in [11] that achieve
the asymptotic optimal download cost when the servers are
non-colluding. For the case of colluding servers, the authors
in [12] constructed a new family of PIR schemes on MDS
coded data achieving a lower download cost than the ones
in [11]. PIR schemes on arbitrary linear storage codes were
constructed in [13]. Another line of work is symmetric PIR
that was studied in [14].
In [7], it is shown that the asymptotic PIR capacity for
replicated data, as the number of files m → ∞, for a fixed
number of colluding servers t, is 1− t
n
, where n is the number
of nodes. When the data is coded using an [n, k] MDS code,
it was shown in [10] that the asymptotic capacity is 1 − k
n
.
Codes achieving this PIR rate were first presented in [11].
The problem of constructing PIR schemes on replicated
data in which some servers can be byzantine (malicious)
was considered in [15]–[17]. The asymptotic capacity of PIR
on replicated storage systems with t colluding servers and b
byzantine servers was found in [18] to be 1 − 2b+t
n
. In [19],
the authors investigate the problem of providing symmetric
PIR from a replicated system with colluding servers and
adversaries in the system. A robust PIR scheme on coded data
with colluding and byzantine servers was constructed in [20].
PIR from unsynchronized servers was studied in [21], where
the files are stored on multiple servers such that some servers
are not updated to the latest version, an adaptive PIR scheme
is constructed for the user to retrieve privately the file he/she
requires. The setting of unsynchronized servers in is similar
to the byzantine servers since in both cases, some servers are
responding with false, or not entirely true, information, but the
work in [21] is more restrictive and uses an adaptive scheme.
Contributions: In this paper, we present a general construction
of robust PIR schemes with byzantine servers storing data
coded with arbitrary linear [n, k, d] codes. When the storage
code is a generalized Reed Solomon code with t colluding
servers, r unresponsive servers, and b byzantine servers, if
n ≥ n′ = (ν + 1)k + t+ 2b+ r − 1, for some integer ν ≥ 1,
we achieve a PIR rate of
1−
k + t+ 2b+ r − 1
n′
.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Basic Definitions
We denote the field with q elements by Fq, where q is a
prime power, and the set {1, 2, . . . , n} by [n].
By an [n, k, d] code we refer to a code with length n,
dimension k, and minimum (Hamming) distance d. MDS-
codes are shortly referred to as [n, k] codes, the minimum
distance being implied by the fact that MDS-codes achieve
the Singleton bound, i.e., d = n− k + 1.
A retrieval scheme is said to be t-private if the set of queries
sent to any t-tuple of servers has zero mutual information
with the identity of the desired file. In other words, a set of
t colluding servers cannot draw any conclusions about which
file the user is downloading.
B. Generalized Reed-Solomon Codes
We propose a PIR scheme for which generalized Reed-
Solomon (GRS) storage codes are naturally well-suited. We
recall the basic properties of such codes here.
Definition 1 (GRS Codes). Let α = [α1 · · ·αn] ∈ Fnq such
that αi 6= αj for all i 6= j, and v = [v1 · · · vn] ∈ (F×q )
n. A
generalized Reed-Solomon (GRS) code of dimension k ≤ n is
GRSk(α, v) = {(vif(αi))1≤i≤n|f ∈ Fq[x], deg(f) < k}.
The canonical generator matrix for an [n, k] GRS code is
given by
Gk(α, v) :=


z0 1 · · · 1
z1 α1 · · · αn
z2 α21 · · · α
2
n
...
...
. . .
...
zk−1 αk−11 · · · α
k−1
n

 · diag(v), (1)
where the rows are indexed (in blue) by the function whose
evaluation they represent and diag(v) is the diagonal matrix
with the values vi on the diagonal.
C. Star Products
The star product of two codes will play an integral role in
our PIR scheme, essentially determining its rate.
Definition 2. Consider sub-vector spaces V,W of Fnq . The
star (or Schur) product
V ⋆W := 〈{v ⋆ w : v ∈ V,w ∈ W}〉
is defined as the linear span of all elements v ⋆ w =
[v1w1 · · · vnwn].
For the star product of GRS codes the following useful
equality holds
GRSk(α, v) ⋆ GRSℓ(α,w) = GRSmin{k+ℓ−1,n}(α, v ⋆ w)
III. A PIR SCHEME FOR COLLUDING BYZANTINE
SERVERS
A. General Scheme
We begin by describing a general version of our scheme
that retrieves one codeword from the database (ν = 1). This
scheme is then extended to a variant where several codewords
of the database may be downloaded simultaneously (ν ≥ 1).
When ν = 1, we assume for simplicity that information is
arranged in anm×k matrixX , where every row represents one
file. Let GC be a generator matrix for the storage code C and
GC,j be the j
th column. Then server j stores the vector yj :=
X ·GC,j . As in [12], the queries have a random part (that does
not depend on the desired file index) and a deterministic part.
The random parts of the queries are generated by sampling
m random vectors from a rank t′ retrieval code D. Let E
be a row vector or, equivalently, a generator matrix of a one-
dimensional code. We define a third code, C⋆D⋆E = C ⋆ D +
C ⋆ E, by its generator matrix
(
GC⋆D
GC⋆E
)
, and denote by d⋆ its
minimum distance. Given that
i) the codes C ⋆ D and C ⋆ E intersect only trivially,
ii) C ⋆ E has rank k, and
iii) d⋆ − 1 ≥ 2b+ r,
we have the following theorem.
Theorem 1. Given codes C, D, and a vector E satisfying
properties i), ii), and iii) above, there is a PIR scheme that
downloads an entire file from one query to each of the n
servers, and is correct in the presence of up to b byzantine
and r non-responsive servers. Furthermore, this scheme is t-
private for t < dD⊥ .
Query Construction: Queries are constructed similarly to the
scheme in [12]. Let GD,j be the j
th column of the generator
matrix ofD and U ∈ Fm×t
′
q a randommatrix. Then the queries
are given as
qj = UGD,j + E(j)ei, (2)
where i is the index of the desired file, E(j) denotes the jth
entry of E, and ei is the i
th standard basis vector.
The servers’ responses are rj = qj .yj (the inner product of
the query and the server contents) for non-byzantine servers,
an arbitrary element in Fq for byzantine servers, and an erasure
symbol for non-responsive servers.
We prove that under the assumptions made, the ith row xi
can be retrieved from the response vector, and any t-set of
servers gains no information on the index i.
Proof. Privacy: Resistance against t-collusion follows analo-
gously to the proof in [12].
Correctness: We use any decoding algorithm for the code
C⋆D⋆E to recover the vector ρ = [q1.y1 · · · qn.yn] from the
possibly error and erasure carrying vector we receive from
the servers. The condition iii), d⋆−1 ≥ 2b+r, guarantees de-
codability. The vector ρ is an element of C⋆D⋆E = C⋆D⊕C⋆E
and therefore has a unique representation as
ρ = (z1 . . . zk′z
′
1 . . . z
′
k)
(
GC⋆D
GC⋆E
)
(3)
where k′ is the dimension of C ⋆ D. On the other hand, the
form (2) of the queries gives a decomposition of the response
vector as
ρ ∈ C ⋆ D + (E(1)ei.y1 . . . E(n)ei.yn)
= C ⋆ D + (E(1)ei.XGC,1 . . . E(n)ei.XGC,n)
= C ⋆ D +XiGC⋆E ,
where Xi is the i
th row of the data matrix. Thus, we have
Xi = [z
′
1 · · · z
′
k], and the requested i
th row is the last k
coordinates in the representation (3) of the response.
Clearly, the condition that C ⋆D ∩ C ⋆ E = ∅ implies that
that n ≥ k′ + k, where k′ is the dimension of C ⋆ D. If
n ≥ k′ + νk for ν > 1 we can straightforwardly extend the
scheme to download more than one row, by extending E to
be a matrix with ν rows and requiring that
ii∗) C ⋆ E has rank νk.
To apply this in order to download a single file, we must
assume that the information is arranged in an mν × k matrix
X , so that each file is a ν × k matrix.
We now give an explicit description of a scheme based on
GRS codes for which k′ = k + t− 1.
B. Explicit Schemes from GRS Codes
Let C = GRSk(α, v) be an [n, k] GRS code and assume
t-collusion, b byzantine servers and r non-responsive servers.
Let ν be the maximal integer such that
n ≥ (ν + 1)k + t+ 2b+ r − 1. (4)
We will download ν rows of the database. Let D =
GRSt(α,w) be an [n, t] GRS code on the same evaluation set.
The rows of E will be evaluations of monomials of degrees
µk + t − 1 for 1 ≤ µ ≤ ν multiplied by the diagonal matrix
diag(w):
E =


zk+t−1 αk+t−11 · · · α
k+t−1
n
z2k+t−1 α2k+t−11 · · · α
2k+t−1
n
...
...
. . .
...
zνk+t−1 ανk+t−11 · · · α
νk+t−1
n

 · diag(w).
We see now that C ⋆ D = GRSk+t−1(α, v ⋆ w) and
C ⋆ E =


zk+t−1 αk+t−11 · · · α
k+t−1
n
zk+t αk+t1 · · · α
k+t
n
...
...
. . .
...
z(ν+1)k+t−2 α
(ν+1)k+t−2
1 · · · α
(ν+1)k+t−2
n


·diag(v⋆w).
Hence the code C⋆D⋆E = GRS(ν+1)k+t−1(α, v ⋆ w) is again
a GRS code. It is now easy to see that properties i) and ii∗)
are fulfilled. Furthermore the minimum distance of C⋆D⋆E is
given as d⋆ = n − (ν + 1)k − t + 2 which by (4) implies
d⋆ − 1 ≥ 2b+ r. We summarize in the following theorem.
Theorem 2. Let the database be encoded using an [n, k] GRS
code C. Assume t-collusion, b byzantine, and r non-responsive
servers, and let n ≥ n′ = (ν + 1)k+ t+ 2b+ r − 1, where ν
is maximal. Then we can achieve a rate of
νk
n′
=
νk
(ν + 1)k + t+ 2b+ r − 1
.
This is achieved by puncturing, i.e., only using n′ servers
and choosing an [n′, t] GRS code D as the query code, and
generating the queries as described above.
We venture the following conjecture.
Conjecture 1. The PIR capacity C for t-colluding, [n, k] coded
storage system with b byzantine and r non-responsive servers
satisfies
lim
m→∞
C = 1−
k + t+ 2b+ r − 1
n
as the number of files m increases.
Let us conclude this section with an example.
Example 1. Let n = 13, k = 2, t = 3, b = 2, and r = 1. We
design a scheme with rate R = 413 = 1−
k+t+2b+r−1
n
.
We encode using a GRS code of length 13, using the evaluation
vector α = (α1, . . . , α13) and v = 1 the all ones vector:
GC =
(
z0 1 · · · 1
z1 α1 · · · α13
)
.
Every file consists of two rows
(
x
s,1
1
x
s,1
2
x
s,2
1
x
s,2
2
)
and is encoded into
two codewords
(
y
s,1
1
···ys,1
13
y
s,2
1
···ys,2
13
)
. We choose D to be GRS3(α,1)
with generator matrix
GD =

z0 1 · · · 1z1 α1 · · · α13
z2 α21 · · · α
2
13

.
The matrix E has to be chosen such that C⋆D⋆E is an error
correcting code that can tolerate 1 erasure and correct up to
2 errors, hence d⋆ − 1 ≥ 5. We pick
E =
(
z4 α41 · · · α
4
13
z6 α61 · · · α
6
13
)
.
The code C⋆D⋆E is generated by the matrix
GC⋆D
⋆E
=


z0 1 · · · 1
z1 α1 · · · α13
z2 α21 · · · α
2
13
z3 α31 · · · α
3
13
z4 α41 · · · α
4
13
z5 α51 · · · α
5
13
z6 α61 · · · α
6
13
z7 α71 · · · α
7
13


and is a [13, 8, 6] GRS code. The queries are generated by
choosing 2m random codewords ds,t, 1 ≤ s ≤ m, 1 ≤ t ≤
2, from D and adding E to the rows corresponding to the
requested file i:
(q1 . . . qn) =


d1,1
d1,2
...
dm,1
dm,2

+


0
...
E1
E2...
0


The response vector is a codeword in C⋆D⋆E with up to 2 errors
and 1 erasure. We decode to the vector
ρ =
m∑
s=1
ds,1 ⋆ ys,1 + ds,2 ⋆ ys,2 + E1 ⋆ y
i,1 + E2 ⋆ y
i,2.
Since C ⋆ D and C ⋆ E intersect trivially we can separate
the part pertaining to file i from the vector ρ. The code
C ⋆ E is generated by the last four rows of GC⋆D
⋆E
. Condition
iii) guarantees that we can recover x
i,1
1 , x
i,1
2 , x
i,2
1 , x
i,2
2 . The
achieved rate is R = 2k
n
= 413 .
C. Comparison with Previous PIR Schemes
Recently, Zhang and Ge [20] have constructed a PIR scheme
for coded data and colluding servers, which is adaptable
for unresponsive and byzantine servers (but not for both
simultaneously). In this section we briefly compare the rates
obtained in this paper with those of [20] in the asymptotic
regime as m → ∞. On the one hand, the current scheme is
maximally efficient when n = n′ = (ν+1)k+t+2b+r−1. On
the other hand, the scheme of [20] only achieves positive rates
assuming certain inequalities in the basic system parameters
are satisfied, namely the obvious inequalities which guarantee
that the expressions below in (5) and (6) are positive. To
compare the two schemes at their best, we grant both of these
assumptions.
When b = 0 and r > 0, the asymptotic rate as m → ∞
from [20] can be expressed as
R¯ =
n
n− r
((
n−r
k
)
+
(
n−t
k
)
−
(
n
k
)(
n
k
)
)
. (5)
An elementary calculation shows that R¯ <
n−(k+t+r−1)
n
, the
rate obtained for the scheme described in the previous sections.
In the case where b > 0 and r = 0, the asymptotic rate
obtained in [20] is
R¯ =
2
((
n−b
k
)
−
(
n
k
))
+
(
n−t
k
)
(
n
k
) (6)
which, again by a simple argument, is less than
n−(k+t+2b−1)
n
,
the rate obtained by the proposed scheme in this case.
Lastly, we remark that the rates obtained in [20] decrease
with an increasing number of files, while the rates we obtain
are constant in the number of files. As noted in [20], the rates
therein outperform those of [12] for a small number of files.
We can see from figure 1 that the same holds here, but we save
more precise analysis for an extended version of this paper.
1 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Number of files m
P
IR
ra
te
Rate in Theorem 2 b = 2 and r = 0
Rate in Theorem 2 b = 0 and r = 2
Rate in [20] b = 2 and r = 0
Rate in [20] b = 0 and r = 2
Fig. 1: PIR rate versus number of files m when n = 12, k = 2, and
t = 3 following the scheme in [20] and the scheme in this paper.
D. A Symmetric Variant
A PIR scheme is symmetric if the user, while retrieving the
required file xi, gains no information about any of the other
files xi
′
for i 6= i′. To construct a symmetric modification
of our scheme, we assume the servers have access to a joint
source of randomness. This joint source of randomness outputs
a uniform random codeword s = [s1 · · · sn] of C⋆D, and sends
sj to server j.
All servers then compute rj = qj .yj + sj , which the
responsive, non-byzantine servers transmit back to the user.
As before, the user receives an erasure symbol from the non-
responsive servers, and a random element of Fq from the
Byzantine servers. Also as before, the user decodes in C⋆D⋆E
to obtain the vector ρ as in (3), which is now easily seen to
be of the form
ρ = s′ +XiGC⋆E (7)
where s′ is uniform on C ⋆ D and independent of any file
indices. Clearly ρ is independent of the contents of any file
xi
′
for i′ 6= i, which guarantees symmetry.
IV. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
A PIR scheme was presented in this paper which can simul-
taneously handle coded data, colluding servers, non-responsive
servers, and byzantine servers. The scheme is an extension of
previous work on PIR [12] which is based on the star product
of linear codes. In the current work, the response from the
servers has additional coding-theoretic properties which allow
the user to correct for the erasures and errors produced by the
non-responsive and byzantine servers. The scheme has rate
1 − k+2b+t+r−1
n′
, where n′ = (ν + 1)k + t + 2b + r − 1
and ν is the largest integer such that n′ ≤ n. The scheme
compares favorably to previous schemes which account for
non-responsive and byzantine servers, and additionally is
easily symmetrizable.
The most immediate future work will consist of generalizing
this scheme so that it does not require puncturing, and achieves
rate 1− k+t+2b+r−1
n
for any set of parameters such that k+t+
2b+ r−1 ≤ n. Additionally, when symmetrizing our scheme,
we hope to quantify how much randomness are needed for
symmetrization. We loosely conjecture that the current version
is doing this with maximal efficiency, namely that k+ t−1 =
dimC ⋆D q-ary units of randomness are necessary. We hope
to prove this in an extended version of the current work.
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